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HOW THE D.C. CIRCUIT MADE DOWNWIND ATTAINMENT UNATTAINABLE IN HOMER CITY 
 In October 1948, a dense fog of air pollution formed over the industrial town of Donora, 
Pennsylvania.
1
  The cloud remained for five days, killed 20 people, and resulted in the 
development of respiratory problems in 6,000 of the 14,000 town residents.
2
  A subsequent 
investigation revealed extraordinary levels of several pollutants, including sulfur dioxide, 
fluorides, and soluble sulphants in the air.
3
  The atmospheric contamination was caused by 
various sources, including a nearby zinc smelting plant, a sulphuric acid plant, and coal burning 
steam locomotives.
4
 
 In December 1952, a "Killer Fog" consumed London.
5
  The condition was caused by an 
especially cold November and the resultant burning of records amounts of coal.
6
  The smog was 
so thick, and visibility so poor, that buses had to be escorted by guides carrying flashlights.
7
  As 
a result, at least 3,000 people had perished.
8
 
 It was events such as the above that led to the enactment of the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 
1970.
9
  While the above events are not at risk of recurring, the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the agency tasked with implementing the CAA, continues to pursue 
                                                          
1
 EPA.GOV., Understanding the Clean Air Act,  http://www.epa.gov/air/peg/understand.html (last visited January 
10, 2013). 
2
 Id.; see also Papers of James H. Duff, The Donora Smog Disaster (October 31, 1948) (on file with Pennsylvania 
State Archives), available at http://www.donorasmog.com/archivesdonorasmogdisaster.htm.  
3
 Duff, supra note 2. 
4
 Id. 
5
 EPA.GOV., supra note 1. 
6
 John Metcalf, Dec. 9, 1952: 'Killer Fog' smothers up to 12,000 Londoners, STORM WATCH 7 WEATHER BLOG 
(Dec. 9, 2011, 2:57 PM), http://www.wjla.com/blogs/weather/2011/12/dec-9-1952-killer-fog-smothers-4-000-
people-in-london-13893.html.  
7
 EPA.GOV., supra note 1; see also Metcalf, supra note 6.  
8
 Id. 
9
 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006). 
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its statutory mandate to improve air quality in the United States.  The EPA's efforts often trigger 
legal challenges by states and industry.  In the past fifteen years this has been particularly true 
with respect to the subject of this Comment—cross-state air pollution.10  Pollutants can travel 
great distances and thereby affect health not only locally but regionally.
11
  "The transport of 
these pollutants across state borders makes it difficult for downwind states to meet health-based 
air quality standards" set by the EPA.
12
  The EPA's efforts to prevent such effects have been 
litigated each step of the way, as the EPA has tried to achieve the requisite environmental gains 
in a cost effective manner, as required by the spirit of the 1990 amendments to the CAA.  As the 
following explains in detail, the EPA lost the most recent battle, and possibly the war, in EME 
Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A. ("Homer City")
13
 where the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit")
14
 eviscerated the EPA's cost-based approach, as 
well as any likelihood that cross-state air pollution will be controlled in the foreseeable future.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 "[A]ir quality in a particular location - even close to a source like a power plant - is due to 
a combination of local emissions and emissions from upwind sources hundreds of miles away.  
This long-distance transport of pollution across state lines makes it difficult for downwind states 
to" meet the minimum air quality standards set by United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA)
15
, even if a downwind state is adequately regulating sources within its borders.  
To deal with the problem of upwind states adversely affecting air quality in downwind states, the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) includes language, known as the Good Neighbor provision, which 
                                                          
10
 Michigan v. EPA 213 F.3d 663 (D.C.Cir.2000); North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008); EME 
Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A., 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
11
 EPA.GOV., Interstate Air Pollution Transport, http://www.epa.gov/airtransport/ (last visited March 2, 2013). 
12
 Id.  
13
 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A. 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
14
 Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.  
15
 EPA.GOV., Where You Live, http://www.epa.gov/airtransport/whereyoulive.html (last visited January 6, 2013).  
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prohibits an upwind state from emitting pollutants that will "contribute significantly" to a 
downwind states failure to meet the minimum air quality standards.
16
   Under the authority of 
this provision, the EPA promulgated the Transport Rule, also known as the Cross-State Air 
Pollution Rule (CSAPR),
17
 in August 2011.
18
  The Transport Rule requires power plants in 
twenty-seven states to reduce their emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
because their emissions "significantly affect the ability of downwind states to attain and 
maintain" minimum air quality standards.
19
  Upon legal challenge, however, the Transport Rule 
was struck down in Homer City by the D.C. Circuit as exceeding the statutory authority of the 
EPA.
20
  This Comment examines the Homer City decision. 
 Many different states contribute to air quality in a given downwind location and the EPA 
is faced with the complicated task of first determining which of the upwind states are 
"significantly" impacting downwind air quality in a particular downwind state (such states are 
hereinafter referred to as "significant contributors") and second deciding the degree to which 
each so identified state must reduce its pollution emissions to rectify the problem.
21
  Deciding 
which states are significant contributors is not and has never been controversial.  Apportioning 
the necessary emission reductions among the significant contributors, however, is the sticking 
point.
22
  The cap-and-trade programs
23
 historically implemented by EPA have focused on 
                                                          
16
 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).  
17
 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A., 696 F.3d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
18
 Transport Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011). 
19
 Id. at 48,208–09. 
20
 Homer City, 696 F.3d at 11. 
21
 See generally Transport Rule 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208. 
22
 See generally Homer City 696 F.3d 7; Michigan v. U.S. E.P.A., 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000); N. Carolina v. 
E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
23
 "Cap and trade is a market-based policy tool for protecting human health and the environment by controlling large 
amounts of emissions from a group of sources. A cap and trade program first sets an aggressive cap, or maximum 
limit, on emissions. Sources covered by the program then receive authorizations to emit in the form of emissions 
allowances, with the total amount of allowances limited by the cap. Each source can design its own compliance 
strategy to meet the overall reduction requirement, including the sale or purchase of allowances, installation of 
pollution controls, and implementation of efficiency measures, among other options. Individual control requirements 
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ensuring that emission reductions are achieved in a cost-effective manner.
24
  The Transport Rule 
is one such program and through the Transport Rule the EPA made cost-effectiveness even more 
of a focus. That is, the Transport Rule only requires an upwind state to reduce emissions so long 
as it can be done cheaply.
25
  The effect of this cost-based approach is that those states that can 
reduce emissions cheaply are required to dramatically reduce their emissions, while those states 
for which achieving reductions would be expensive are allocated a lesser burden.
26
  The degree 
to which a state must reduce its emissions, therefore, is not directly tied to the extent that its 
emissions affect air quality in downwind areas, but is rather tied to its costs of reducing its 
emissions.  Thus, the critical question regarding the Transport Rule is whether the EPA can 
require certain states to bear a greater burden of the necessary emission reductions, solely 
because they can do so more cheaply than another.
27
  In Homer City, the D.C. Circuit answered 
this question in the negative.
28
  The court found that the Transport Rule, in effect, shifts the 
burdens of overall compliance from those states that most detrimentally affect downwind areas, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
are not specified under a cap and trade program, but each emission source must surrender allowances equal to its 
actual emissions in order to comply. Sources must also completely and accurately measure and report all emissions 
in a timely manner to guarantee that the overall cap is achieved.  
 
 A well-designed cap and trade program delivers:  
 
 - Greater environmental protection at lower cost 
 - Broad regional reductions, facilitating state efforts to address local impacts 
 - Early reductions, a result of allowance banking and market incentives 
 - Environmental integrity and transparent operations and results 
 - Fewer administrative costs to government and industry 
 - Efficiency and innovation incentives 
 - Incentives for doing better and consequences for doing worse 
 - Accounting for all emissions 
 - Partnership with existing requirements to ensure protection of the local population and environment" 
 
EPA.GOV, Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/captrade/basic-info.html (last visited March 1, 2013).  
24
 Ed Dolan, Court Rejects EPA Cross-State Air Pollution Rule. Where to Next?, 
http://www.economonitor.com/dolanecon/2012/08/27/court-rejects-epa-cross-state-air-pollution-rule-where-to-next/, 
(last visited January 10, 2013). 
25
 See Transport Rule at 48,246–48. 
26
 Homer City, 696 F.3d at 11 ("[U]nder the Transport Rule, upwind States may be required to reduce emissions by 
more than their own significant contributions to a downwind State[] . . ."). 
27
 Id.  
28
 Id.  
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to those upwind states that can achieve emission reductions most cheaply.
29
  This, the D.C. 
Circuit found impermissible.
30
 
 The Transport Rule was also struck down on a second ground.  Under the CAA, the states 
are provided the first opportunity to regulate the emitters of pollution within its borders.
31
  The 
EPA determines the degree of reductions that must be achieved within a state to promote public 
health and welfare, but it is the state that first decides how those reductions will be 
accomplished.
32
  A state is provided the opportunity to do so through a State Implementation 
Plan (SIP).
33
  It is only after a state fails to promulgate a sufficient SIP that the EPA can 
intercede and directly regulate the sources of pollution through a Federal Implementation Plan 
(FIP).
34
  Through the Transport Rule, however, the EPA promulgated FIPs, which directly 
regulate sources within the subject states, without providing the states the first opportunity to 
implement the required emission reductions via SIPs.
35
  To the court, this approach by the EPA 
impermissibly encroached on the role first reserved to the states by the cooperative federalism
36
 
structure of the CAA.
37
   
 Part I of this Comment provides background to the CAA generally, and the Good 
Neighbor provision specifically.  Part II discusses the seminal cases interpreting the Good 
                                                          
29
 Id. at 27 ("[W]hen EPA asks one upwind State to eliminate more than its statutory fair share, that State is 
necessarily being forced to clean up another upwind State's share of the mess in the downwind State"). 
30
 Id. at 11. 
31
 Id. at 28. 
32
 Id.  
33
 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7410(a)(1) (2006). 
34
 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (2006). 
35
 Transport Rule 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,208. 
36
 Cooperative federalism is where "state and local governments administer and implement federal programs. Many 
state-administered programs are funded by the federal government, in whole or, more often, in part. Others take the 
form of conditional preemption, meaning that the states may choose to administer the federal program or else, cede 
the regulatory field to the federal government. Cooperative federalism covers an enormous array of regulatory fields, 
from the environment to education to welfare . . . ." Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. 
L.J. 557, 558 (2000) 
37
 Homer City, 696 F.3d at 34 ("In sum, the text and context of the statute, and the precedents of the Supreme Court 
and this Court, establish the States' first-implementer role under [and] [w]e decline to adopt a reading of . . . that 
would blow a hole in that basic structural principle"). 
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Neighbor provision prior to the Homer City decision. Part III details the Transport Rule and the 
judicial holdings of the Homer City case.  Part IV critically analyzes the application of the case 
law and statutory principles to the Transport Rule in Homer City.  Part V discusses how to 
resolve this judicial debacle.  Part VI concludes. 
 This Comment argues that although the Homer City rejection of the EPA's cost-based 
approach can be reconciled with the literal text of the CAA, because the EPA's approach may 
also be reconciled with the CAA and is consistent with the D.C. Circuit's Good Neighbor 
provision precedent, the EPA's interpretation should have been upheld as permissible.  
Furthermore, because the Homer City decision effectively prevents the EPA's use of cost-based 
factors, a reversion to a command-and-control
38
 approach to cross-state air pollution is 
inevitable. This result can only be avoided through a change in course by the judiciary, which 
can only be achieved via Supreme Court review
39
 or a statutory amendment to the CAA 
expressly authorizing the EPA to use cost-considerations while implementing the Good 
Neighbor provision.  With respect to the EPA's practice of directly regulating state sources of 
pollution through FIPs, this Comment argues that the plain language of the statute allows the 
EPA this flexibility wherever the states have utterly failed to address their obligations. 
I. BACKGROUND AND BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CAA—AIR POLLUTANTS, NAAQS, 
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM, AND THE GOOD NEIGHBOR PROVISION 
 
 Under Title I of the CAA, the EPA is required to establish minimum air quality 
standards, necessary to protect the public from the adverse effects of air pollution.
40
  In statutory 
jargon, these air quality standards are known as national ambient air quality standards 
                                                          
38
 "'Command and control' regulations focus on preventing environmental problems by specifying how a company 
will manage a pollution-generating process. This approach generally relies on detailed regulations followed up by an 
ongoing inspection program." Ralph Stuart, Command and Control Regulation, 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Command_and_control_regulation (last visited March 2, 2013). 
39
 The EPA's petition for rehearing en banc was denied on January 24, 2013. See 
http://www.winston.com/index.cfm?contentID=19&itemID=168&itemType=25&postid=1248.  
40
 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (2006). 
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(“NAAQS”).41   The NAAQS are the "centerpiece" of the CAA.42   NAAQS must be established 
for each air pollutant "which may . . . endanger public health or welfare . . ."
43
 and are to be 
established at a level necessary to protect the public from "known or anticipated adverse effects 
associated with the presence of . . . air pollutant[s] in the ambient air."
44
 "Ambient air is the air to 
which the general public has access, as opposed to air within a facility or at a smokestack."
45
  
The EPA has established NAAQS for six common air pollutants: nitrogen dioxide (NO2), carbon 
monoxide (CO), lead (Pb), SO2, particulate matter (PM), and ozone (O3).
46
    
 The CAA also requires the EPA to divide the country into areas designated as 
“nonattainment,” “attainment,” or “unclassifiable” with regards to each air pollutant, depending 
on whether the area meets the NAAQS.
47
   A geographic area that meets the NAAQS is an 
attainment area; areas that do not meet the NAAQS or contribute pollution to nearby areas that 
do not meet the NAAQS, are called nonattainment areas.
48
   "An area may be designated 
attainment for some pollutants and nonattainment for others."
49
  An unclassifiable area is an area 
that cannot be classified on the basis of available information.
50
 
 While it is the EPA's responsibility to set the NAAQS for each of these pollutants,
51
 each 
state, not the EPA, is charged with initial authority to regulate the emitters within its borders to 
                                                          
41
 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A), (B) (2006). 
42
 Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2347 (1996). 
43
 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A), (B) (2006). 
44
 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (2006). 
45
 EPA.GOV, Air Quality Management - National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for Criteria Pollutants, 
http://www.epa.gov/apti/course422/apc4a.html (last visited January 10, 2013).  
46
 Id.  
47
 42 U.S.C. § 7407(c), (d) 
48
 EPA.GOV, supra note 45. 
49
 EPA.GOV, supra note 45. 
50
 EPA.GOV, supra note 45. 
51
 The pollutants subject to the NAAQS derive from various sources.   Carbon Monoxide (CO) is a colorless, 
odorless gas formed when carbon in fuel is not burned completely.    Motor vehicle exhaust, industrial processes, 
residential wood burning, and forest fires all contribute CO to the atmosphere.   Sulfur Oxides (SOx) are colorless 
gases formed by burning sulfur and is formed when fuel containing sulfur (e.g. coal and oil) is burned, and when 
gasoline is extracted from oil.   Over 65% of SO2 released to the air comes from electric utilities.   Nitrogen oxides 
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ensure attainment of the NAAQS.
52
  Each state must develop a SIP demonstrating how it will 
regulate sources within its borders to attain and maintain each NAAQS.
53
   Specifically, "[e]ach 
State shall . . . adopt . . . within 3 years . . . after the promulgation of a [NAAQS], a plan which 
provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such . . . standard . . . within [the] 
State."
54
   But if a state is untimely in submitting a compliant SIP, the obligation to regulate 
emission sources within that state vests in the EPA, which must promulgate a FIP for the state to 
follow.
55
  Specifically, the EPA "shall promulgate a [FIP] at any time within 2 years after [it] 
finds that a State has failed to make a required submission or finds that the plan . . . does not 
satisfy the minimum criteria . . ."
56
  The EPA must also promulgate a FIP if it "disapproves a 
[SIP] . . . unless the State corrects the deficiency, and [EPA] approves the plan . . . before [it] 
promulgates such [FIP]."
57
  In short, the states are provided the first opportunity to decide how 
they will attain the NAAQS.
58
  If, within the prescribed timeframe—three years—a state fails to 
effectively regulate the polluters within its borders, then the EPA must determine which emitters 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(NOx) are a group of highly reactive gases that are involved in the formation of ozone.   Nitrogen oxides form when 
fuel is burned at high temperatures.    The primary sources of NOx are motor vehicles, electric utilities, and other 
industrial, commercial, and residential sources that burn fuels.    Ozone (O3) is a gas composed of three oxygen 
atoms and is not usually emitted directly into the air, but at ground level is created by a chemical reaction between 
oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the presence of heat and sunlight.   The 
concentration of ozone in a given locality is influenced by many factors, including the concentration of NO2 and 
VOCs in the area, the intensity of the sunlight, and the local weather conditions.   Ozone and the chemicals that react 
to form it can be carried hundreds of miles from their origins, causing air pollution over wide regions.   Lead (Pb) is 
a metal found naturally in the environment as well as in manufactured products.   The major sources of lead 
emissions have historically been motor vehicles (such as cars and trucks) and industrial sources.   The highest levels 
of lead in air are generally found near lead smelters.    Particulate Matter is the general term used for a 
heterogeneous mixture of solid particles and liquid droplets found in the air, including dust, dirt, soot, smoke, and 
liquid droplets.   Particles can be suspended in the air for long periods of time.   They come from a variety of sources 
such as cars, trucks, buses, factories, construction sites, tilled fields, unpaved roads, stone crushing, burning of 
wood, and the combustion in motor vehicles, at power plants, and in other industrial processes.   PM2.5 describes 
the "fine" particles that are less than or equal to 2.5 µm in diameter.   PM10 refers to all particles less than or equal 
to 10 µm in diameter (about one-seventh the diameter of a human hair).   
52
 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7410(a)(1) (2006). 
53
 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2006). 
54
 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006). 
55
 42 U.S.C.  § 7410(c)(1) (2006). 
56
 Id.  
57
 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006). 
58
 Id.  
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in the state will be regulated, and to what extent.
59
  This practice, by which the states implement 
federal programs, is known as cooperative federalism.
60
  
 The SIP/FIP dynamic discussed above also applies where emissions of a state travel 
downwind and result in a downwind state's inability to the meet the NAAQS for one or more 
criteria pollutants.
61
  Under the Good Neighbor provision of the CAA, added as an amendment in 
1990,
62
  each SIP (or FIP) must "contain adequate provisions—prohibiting . . . any source . . . 
within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will contribute significantly to 
nonattainment in . . . any other State with respect to any such [NAAQS] . . . ."
63
  It is this 
language—determining how to regulate those emissions that "contribute significantly to 
nonattainment" in a downwind state—that has proven problematic for the D.C. Circuit and EPA.  
II. PAST EPA EFFORTS TO APPLY THE GOOD NEIGHBOR PROVISION 
 Some sources of air pollution are well positioned to reduce emission levels, while others 
are not.  For those that can only reduce air emissions through implementation of costly measures, 
compliance with mandated emission reduction requirements can be financially crippling.  
Because the effect of these regulations can disproportionately affect different emission sources, 
the regulatory scheme historically employed by the EPA
64
 has recognized the utility of achieving 
emission reductions in the most cost-effective manner.
65
  The Transport Rule pushed the use of 
this cost-based approach to its furthest end yet.  The EPA's predominant consideration in 
deciding who is required to effect necessary emission reductions, through the Transport Rule and 
under the auspices of the Good Neighbor provision, was whether a state could achieve emissions 
                                                          
59
 Id.  
60
 Greve, supra note 36.  
61
 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006). 
62
 Michigan v. U.S. E.P.A., 213 F.3d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
63
 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006). 
64
 EPA's approach is known as cap-and-trade. See supra, note 23. 
65
 Id.  
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cheaply,
66
 rather than the effect of those emissions on downwind NAAQS.
67
  Such an approach 
effectively shifted the burdens from those states that were most detrimentally affecting 
downwind areas, to those states that could achieve emission reductions cheaply.  In determining 
that such an approach is impermissible, the precedent of the D.C. Circuit was controlling. 
 Homer City was the culmination of a decade's worth of doctrinal narrowing.  The 
contours of the EPA's authority have taken shape through the decisions of the D.C. Circuit.
68
  
This process commenced in Michigan v. EPA,
69
 continued in North Carolina v. EPA,
70
 and came 
to a head in Homer City.  What started as a seeming endorsement of cost-based apportioning of 
emission reduction obligations, has now taken a one hundred and eighty degree turn, 
jeopardizing a decade's worth of regulation and the resultant environmental gains.  The 
remainder of this section traces the seminal cases, Michigan and North Carolina, whose 
doctrinal interpretations were put to work in Homer City. 
 A. Michigan v. EPA 
 
 In Michigan v. EPA, twenty-two states challenged the EPA's 1998 NOx Rule,
71
 which 
quantified their Good Neighbor obligations under the 1997 ozone NAAQS.
72
  These states 
argued that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority by impermissibly using cost-considerations 
in determining to what extent each state must reduce its emissions.
73
   
                                                          
66
 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A., 696 F.3d 7, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
67
 See Transport Rule 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 46–48.  
68
 Michigan v. EPA 213 F.3d 663 (D.C.Cir.2000); North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008); EME 
Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A., 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
69
 213 F.3d 663 (D.C.Cir.2000). 
70
 North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896, 903-04 on reh'g in part, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
71
 See 63 Fed.Reg. 57,356–58. 
72
 Michigan v. U.S. E.P.A., 213 F.3d 663, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
73
 Id. at 669. 
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 The 1998 NOx Rule utilized a two-step process to determine each state's Good Neighbor 
obligation.  First, the EPA determined those states that were "significant contributors,"
74
 and, as 
such, were required to reduce their ozone emissions.
75
  The significant contributors were 
identified as those states that contributed more than two parts per billion (ppb) of ozone to a 
downwind non-attainment area.
76
  The D.C. Circuit in Michigan described this amount as a "very 
low threshold."
77
  Determining which states were significant contributors was not controversial.   
 After determining which states would be subject to a Good Neighbor obligation, the 
EPA's next step was to determine the extent of that obligation.
78
  Rather than requiring each state 
to reduce its emissions down to the two ppb threshold that was utilized to define those states as 
significant contributors, the EPA required those states to reduce their emissions by the amount 
that could be achieved through "highly cost-effective controls."
79
  Therefore, although two ppb 
was the threshold for determining whether a state was a significant contributor, this threshold 
was not determinative in defining each state's Good Neighbor obligation.
80
  If a state could not 
cost-effectively reduce its emissions to the two ppb threshold, EPA would not compel the state to 
do so.
81
 
 The D.C. Circuit upheld the rule, including the EPA's cost-based approach, finding that 
the EPA may "consider differences in cutback costs, so that, after reduction of all that could be 
cost-effectively eliminated, any remaining 'contribution' would not be considered 'significant.'"
82
  
Therefore, "the ultimate line of 'significance,' whether measured in volume of NOx emitted or 
                                                          
74
 Id. at 679. 
75
 Id. at 675-80. 
76
 Id. at 675. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Michigan v. U.S. E.P.A., 213 F.3d 663, 675-80 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
79
 Id. at 675; 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,403. 
80
 Michigan, 213 F.3d at 675. 
81
 Id.  
82
 Id. at 677-79. 
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arriving in nonattainment areas, would vary from state to state depending on variations in 
cutback costs."
83
  Although not explicitly noted by the Michigan court, it is later made clear in 
Homer City, that critical to the 1998 NOx Rule being upheld was that even though the cost-based 
approach served to lessen the potential obligations of those upwind states that could not reduce 
emissions cheaply, no evidence was presented to suggest that these lessened burdens resulted in 
a corresponding increased burden to those upwind states that could reduce their emissions more 
cheaply. 
B. North Carolina v. EPA 
 
 In North Carolina v. EPA the D.C. Circuit reviewed the EPA's 2005 Clean Air Interstate 
Rule (CAIR).
84
  CAIR established the Good Neighbor obligations of twenty-eight states with 
respect to the 1997 ozone and fine particulate matter NAAQS.
85
  The first step for the EPA in 
establishing the Good Neighbor obligations, just as it was with the 1998 NOx Rule upheld in 
Michigan, was to determine which states were significant contributors.
86
  The thresholds for 
being deemed a significant contributor were set at .2 micrograms per cubic meter for fine 
particulate matter and two ppb for ozone.
87
  After utilizing these thresholds to determine which 
states would have a Good Neighbor obligation, the EPA proceeded to define that obligation—
which mirrored the process employed by the 1998 NOx Rule.
88
  The Good Neighbor obligations, 
however, were established on a region-wide, rather than state by state basis,
89
 and included a 
trading program.
90
 
                                                          
83
 Id. at 675. 
84
 See 70 Fed.Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005). 
85
 North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
86
 Id.  
87
 North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 903-04. 
88
 Id.  
89
 Id. at 904. 
90
 "[Trading] programs display the following key features: 
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 With respect to fine particulate matter, the EPA set the total emission budget for the 
region to mirror the fine particulate matter allowances that state power plants received under 
Title IV of the CAA.
91
  The pre-existing Title IV allowances had been established by Congress 
to address an acid rain problem.
92
  Although the Title IV program involved regulating the same 
pollutant that was the subject of the NAAQS—fine particulate matter—the Title IV allowances 
were not established based on downwind non-attainment of NAAQS.
93
  Furthermore, the EPA 
never established a relationship between the pre-existing Title IV allowances and attainment of 
the downwind NAAQS for fine particulate manner.
94
  Essentially, the EPA already had a system 
in place for regulating the emission of fine particulate matter, i.e. the Title IV allowances, and 
rather than independently evaluating whether this system was sufficient to ensure attainment of 
downwind NAAQS, it simply assumed so.
95
  Because the EPA did not establish a connection 
between pre-existing power plant allowances under Title IV and attainment of downwind 
NAAQS, the court struck down the EPA's approach as arbitrary and capricious.
96
  Of relevance 
here is that the EPA apparently believed the approach to be a cost-effective way to achieve the 
NAAQS.
97
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
An emissions 'cap': A limit on the total amount of pollution that can be emitted (released) from all regulated sources 
(e.g., power plants); the cap is set lower than historical emissions in order to reduce emissions. 
Allowances: An authorization to emit a fixed amount of a pollutant. 
Measurement: Accurate tracking of all emissions. 
Flexibility: Sources can choose how to reduce emissions, including whether to buy additional allowances from other 
sources that reduce emissions. 
Allowance trading: Sources can buy or sell allowances on the open market. Because the total number of allowances 
is limited by the cap, emission reductions are assured. 
Compliance: At the end of each compliance period, each source must own at least as many allowances as its 
emissions." EPA.GOV., Allowance Trading Basics, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/trading/basics.html (last visited 
March 3, 2013). 
91
 Id. at 917. 
92
 Id. at 902.  
93
 Id. at 917. 
94
 Id. at 918.  
95
 Id.  
96
 North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896, 917 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
97
 CAIR, 70 Fed.Reg. at 25,199 (quoting Proposed CAIR, 69 Fed.Reg. 4566, 4612 (Jan. 30, 2004)). 
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 With respect to establishing Good Neighbor obligations for the ozone NAAQS, the EPA 
also established a regional cap for upwind states.
98
  The manner in which the regional cap was 
established was not challenged.
99
  The manner in which the emission allowances were then 
distributed, however, was challenged.
100
  In determining the emission allowances that would be 
distributed to each state, the EPA used a methodology unrelated to each state's contribution to 
downwind non-attainment; it was based on the goal of "achieving a reasonable balance of 
regional and local controls to provide a cost-effective and equitable governmental approach to 
attainment."
101
  To achieve this goal of cost-effectiveness, the EPA allocated the emission 
allowances based on how cheaply a state could reduce its emissions.
102
  States that could reduce 
their emissions more cheaply received less allowances; those that could only do so expensively 
received more.
103
  Thus, rather than explaining how its distribution of credits related to each 
states' significant contributions to downwind non-attainment, the EPA simply asserted that the 
distribution would create an equitable balance of controls.
104
  So again, as with the SO2 caps, the 
EPA did not link its distribution of credits to each states contribution to downwind non-
attainment.
105
  The EPA determined a cap for the region and then "evaluated it to assure that it is 
highly cost-effective."
106
  Moreover, the EPA chose this approach because it "reflect[ed] the 
inherently higher emissions rate of coal-fired plants, and consequently the greater burden on coal 
plants to control emissions," thereby creating "a more  equitable budget distribution."
107
  In short, 
because it would be more difficult for states with coal-fired power plants to meet lower emission 
                                                          
98
 North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896, 917 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
99
 Id. at 919. 
100
 Id. at 918. 
101
 Id. (quoting Proposed CAIR, 69 Fed.Reg. at 4612). 
102
 Id. at 920.  
103
 Id. at 920.  
104
 North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896, 919 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
105
 Id.  
106
 CAIR, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,206. 
107
 Id. at 25,231. 
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thresholds, the EPA gave such states more emission credits, irrespective of how the various 
states contributed to downwind non-attainment. 
 The North Carolina court acknowledged that the EPA's determination of each state's 
Good Neighbor obligation may include cost considerations.
108
  However, because CAIR 
involved a regional trading program, the EPA's application of the Good Neighbor provision in 
CAIR did not directly link each state's Good Neighbor obligation to its own cost of reducing 
emissions.
109
  Rather, the EPA made one state's Good Neighbor obligation dependent on another 
state's cost of eliminating emissions.
110
  States burning clean fuels were punished because other 
state's burned dirty fuels, not because of their own significant contribution to downwind non-
attainment of NAAQS.
111
  With these findings, the court found that the Good Neighbor provision 
did not give the EPA the authority to force an upwind state to share the burden of reducing other 
upwind states' Good Neighbor obligations.
112
  Instead, each state must eliminate its own 
significant contribution to downwind pollution.
113
  Because CAIR shifted the burden of emission 
reductions solely in pursuit of equity among upwind states, the resulting state budgets were 
arbitrary and capricious.
114
 
III. THE TRANSPORT RULE AND HOMER CITY 
 
A. The Transport Rule 
                                                          
108
 North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) citing Michigan, 213 F.3d at 677-79. 
109
 North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 896.  
110
 For example, Louisiana's power plants use more gas and oil than most states. Consequently, instead of the budget 
of 42,319 tons per year that would be Louisiana's proportional share of the region-wide cap without fuel adjustment, 
the State only received 29,593 tons per year. The rest of those credits went to states with more coal-fired EGUs than 
average, which necessarily received “larger NOx emissions budgets” than their unadjusted proportional shares. 
111
 CAIR, 70 Fed.Reg. at 25, 231. 
112
 North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 921. 
113
 Id.  
114
 Id. at 918–21. 
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 On August 8, 2011, the EPA issued the Transport Rule,
115
 its replacement for CAIR—the 
rule struck down in North Carolina.
116
  The Transport Rule required SO2 and NOx emission 
reductions from power plants in twenty-seven states.
117
  The required emission reductions, 
expressed as state emission budgets, were intended to address each state's contribution to non-
attainment of NAAQS in downwind states.
118
  Just as it did with the 1997 NOx Rule and with 
CAIR, the EPA again used a two-step process to quantify each state's Good Neighbor 
obligation.
119
  The first step defined which states were significant contributors, based upon 
whether the state emits “amounts which will . . . contribute significantly” to a downwind state's 
nonattainment of the NAAQS.
120
  This initial threshold was established at (i) 0.8 ppb for ozone, 
(ii) 0.15 μg/m3 for annual PM2.5, and (iii) 0.35 μg/m
3
 for 24–hour PM2.5.
121
  If modeling showed 
that a state would send more than those amounts into a downwind state's air, the upwind state 
was deemed a significant contributor.
122
  States contributing amounts greater than the above 
thresholds were subject to Good Neighbor obligations; states contributing less were not required 
to reduce their emissions under the Good Neighbor provision.
123
 
 After determining which states would be subject to Good Neighbor obligations, the 
Transport Rule next determined the extent of that obligation for each state, which was 
established using a cost-based standard.
124
  Each state with a Good Neighbor obligation was 
required to reduce its emissions to the extent that its power plants could achieve the reductions at 
                                                          
115
 Transport Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011). 
116
 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A., 696 F.3d 7, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  
117
 Id. at 11.  
118
 EPA Issues Replacement for Clean Air Interstate Rule, 21 Air Pollution Consultant 4.1 (2011) 
119
 Homer City, 696 F.3d at 15.  
120
 Transport Rule, 76 Fed.Reg. at 48,236. 
121
 Homer City, 696 F.3d at 15. 
122
 Id. at 15–16. 
123
 Id. at 16. 
124
 Id. at 16–17. 
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a specified cost per ton.
125
  Thus, the emissions reductions imposed on the states, once they were 
determined to be significant contributors, was not actually linked to the amount of emissions that 
had been determined to contribute to non-attainment of NAAQS downwind.
126
  Rather, the Good 
Neighbor obligation was based on how much could be reduced cost effectively.
127
  These figures 
were then used to generate emission budgets for each pollutant in each state subject to a Good 
Neighbor obligation.
128
  "The budget is the maximum amount of each pollutant that a State's 
power plants may collectively emit in a given year, beginning in 2012."
129
 
 To ensure that each state would stay within these budgets, the EPA simultaneously 
promulgated FIPs.
130
  The FIPs required power plants in upwind states to make the SO2 and NOx 
reductions needed to comply with each upwind state's emissions budget.
131
  The FIPs also 
created an interstate trading program to allow regulated sources to comply as cost-effectively as 
possible.
132
  The FIPs converted each state's emissions budget into “allowances,” which were 
allocated among power plants in the state.
133
  Under the FIPs, it was the EPA, and not the states, 
that decided how to distribute the allowances among the power plants in each state.
134
 
 The Transport Rule retained a limited, secondary role for SIPs.
135
  States were given the 
option of submitting SIPs that modify some elements of the FIPs.
136
  States could also replace 
the FIPs wholesale as long as the SIP prohibited the amounts of NOx and SO2 emissions 
                                                          
125
 Transport Rule 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,260. 
126
 Homer City, 696 F.3d at 17. 
127
 Id. 
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 See Transport Rule at 48,259–63. 
129
 Id.  
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 Id. at 48,208. 
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 Id. at 48,271. 
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 Id. at 48,212. 
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 See Transport Rule 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,284–88.11. 
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 See Id. at 48,327–28. 
136
 Id. 
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specified by the EPA.
137
  Each SIP was to be reviewed by the EPA "on a case-by-case basis."
138
  
However, the states were not provided a post-Transport Rule opportunity to avoid FIPs by 
submitting a SIP or SIP revision, but rather the FIPs "remain[ed] fully in place in each [] state 
until a state's SIP [was] submitted and approved by EPA to revise or replace a FIP."
139
 
B. Homer City  
 
 As the EPA continued its efforts to finalize and implement the Transport Rule, various 
electric utilities, industry trade associations, and states filed petitions challenging the rule.
140
  
After consolidating the petitions, the D.C. Circuit issued an order staying implementation of the 
Transport Rule pending resolution of the petitions.
141
  Under the order, the CAIR remained in 
effect pending resolution of the Transport Rule challenge.
142
  Congress also entertained various 
legislative initiatives to repeal or postpone the Transport Rule.  In September 2011, for example, 
the House of Representatives passed the Transparency in Regulatory Analysis of Impacts on the 
Nation Act
143
 which would have delayed the Transport Rule pending further study; no action was 
taken on the bill in the Senate.  In November 2011, Senator Rand Paul introduced a resolution to 
repeal the Transport Rule that was defeated by a vote of 56 to 41.
144
 In Homer City, the D.C.  
Circuit reviewed the Transport Rule on the merits. 
i. Homer City Majority 
 
a. The EPA's use of Cost-Considerations 
 
 The majority in Homer City struck down the Transport Rule on two grounds.  Firstly, the 
majority found that the Transport Rule fell outside of the EPA's statutory authority under the 
                                                          
137
 See Id. at 48,328. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
140
 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, No. 11-1302 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 2011). 
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 H.R. 2401 
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CAA because the Good Neighbor obligations assigned to upwind states were not based on the 
emissions from those states that actually "contribute[d] significantly to nonattainment” in 
downwind states.
145
  When the EPA first established a threshold to determine those states that 
were significant contributors, the majority came to see that threshold as a "floor" below which 
any contribution must be viewed as insignificant, and as such, the Good Neighbor provision 
could not be used to mandate reductions below that threshold.
146
  Despite this, the Transport 
Rule did, in some cases, require states to reduce their contributions to levels below that floor.
147
  
This resulted because the Transport Rule required states to eliminate all emissions that could be 
achieved at a specified cost per ton.
148
  The Transport Rule did not cap these reductions at any 
particular numerical emission threshold, but instead states were required to continue to reduce 
emissions until further reductions were no longer cost effective.  To the majority, when the EPA 
ignored this initial threshold in determining each state's Good Neighbor obligation, it served to 
"redefine each State's 'significant contribution' in such a way that an upwind State's required 
reductions could be more than its own significant contribution to a downwind State."
149
  In other 
words, "if amounts below a numerical threshold do not contribute significantly to a downwind 
State's nonattainment, EPA may not require an upwind State to do more."
150
  Because the EPA 
did just that, the court found that the Transport Rule exceeded the EPA's statutory authority 
under the CAA.
151
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 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A., 696 F.3d 7, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
146
 Id. at 25–26. 
147
 Id. at 25.  
148
 Transport Rule 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,260. 
149
 Homer City, 696 F.3d at 25–26.  
150
 Id. at 26.  
151
 Id.  
20 
 
 Relatedly, the majority found that the Transport Rule violated the "proportionality 
requirement" as described in North Carolina.
152
  Specifically, the court found that the EPA has 
"no authority to force an upwind state to share the burden of reducing other upwind states' 
emissions."
153
  In the majority's view, when a state is required to reduce its emissions to a level 
below that which contributes significantly to non-attainment downwind, the additional burdens 
serve to compensate for reduced Good Neighbor obligations conferred to other states.
154
  That is, 
just as the EPA's cost-based approach required states that could cheaply reduce emissions to 
"exceed the mark," the cost-based approach simultaneously served to limit the Good Neighbor 
obligations of those states that could only reduce emissions through costly measures.
155
 The 
majority did acknowledge that, under Michigan, the EPA may rely on cost factors to reduce the 
Good Neighbor obligations of those states where it would be very expensive for them to hit the 
numerical threshold.
156
  For the majority, the EPA's reliance on cost factors could not also extend 
to require a state to eliminate more "than its statutory fair share," because "that State is 
necessarily being forced to compensate for another upwind State's downwind contribution."
157
  
The court found this result—the EPA's failure to allocate the required reductions on a 
proportional basis— to be impermissible under both the statute and North Carolina.158  
 Thirdly, and again relatedly, the majority found that the EPA failed to ensure that the 
cumulative Good Neighbor obligations of the various upwind states did not produce unnecessary 
over-control in the downwind States.
159
  The court found the EPA's statutory authority to be 
                                                          
152
 Id. at 26.  
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 Id. quoting North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
154
 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A., 696 F.3d 7, 26–27 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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limited to merely attaining the NAAQS in the downwind states,
160
  and as such, the EPA could 
not require the upwind states to do more than necessary to accomplish that goal.
161
  Because the 
Transport Rule did not take steps to avoid such over-control, the majority deemed it 
impermissible under the CAA.
162
 
b. The EPA's Use of FIP's 
 The majority also vacated the Transport Rule on a second, entirely independent ground.  
While establishing each upwind state's Good Neighbor obligation, the EPA simultaneously 
issued FIPs to implement emission reduction measures directly on sources in those states, to 
enforce those Good Neighbor obligations.
163
  The EPA did so without giving the states the initial 
opportunity to promulgate SIP's to implement the obligation themselves.
164
 The majority 
concluded that such a practice is not authorized by the CAA.
165
 
 In supporting its position that the EPA did not have the authority to implement the 
emission reduction measures through FIPs prior to giving the states the opportunity to submit 
SIPs, the majority first pointed to uncontested principles regarding the structure of the CAA.
166
  
Under the CAA, the EPA has authority to set NAAQS, but the role of first-implementer is 
reserved for the states.
167
  It is only after a state fails to submit a sufficient SIP that the EPA may 
promulgate FIPS.
168
  Here, the EPA conceded that the state has three years to implement its 
SIP.
169
  Despite this the EPA argued that the three year period available to the state began to run 
at the establishment of the NAAQS (i.e. 1997), not when the EPA gets around to quantifying the 
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state's numerical obligation under the Good Neighbor provision.
170
  Under such a construction, 
the states were required to develop SIPs that incorporate their Good Neighbor obligation by 
2000.
171
  Because the states did not effectively develop SIPs satisfying their Good Neighbor 
obligations, the EPA contended that it was authorized to promulgate FIPs at any time 
thereafter.
172
  The majority, however, found that the three year period for implementing a SIP 
began to run when the EPA quantified the Good Neighbor obligations of the various states and 
notified them of the same.
173
  In the view of the majority, the "EPA's approach punishes the 
States for failing to meet a standard that EPA had not yet announced and the States did not yet 
know."
174
 
 The relevant statutory language can be found in Section 110 of the CAA, which governs 
SIPs.
175
  Section 110(a)(1) requires states to submit SIPs to implement each new or revised 
NAAQS.
176
  Section 110(a)(2) lists many elements that a SIP must contain to enable the state to 
attain the NAAQS, and measures to satisfy the states Good Neighbor obligation is one such  
required element.
177
  Furthermore, the statute requires that when the EPA finds that a state "has 
failed to make a required submission" or "disapproves a [SIP] submission in whole or in part," 
the EPA must "promulgate a [FIP]" within two years, "unless the State corrects the deficiency" 
in the interim, in a manner approved by the EPA.
178
 
 The majority defined the issue as whether a state's implementation of its Good Neighbor 
obligation can be considered part of the state's "required submission" in its SIP, or whether the 
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SIP can be deficient for failing to incorporate the Good Neighbor obligation, even before the 
EPA quantifies the state's Good Neighbor obligation.
179
  In the majority's view, a state cannot be 
required to address its Good Neighbor obligation as part of the initial SIP submission.
180
  Rather, 
it is the EPA's quantifying of a state's Good Neighbor obligation is what "require[d]" the state to 
make a "submission" implementing the Good Neighbor obligation on sources within the state.
181
  
It is only after the EPA had set the relevant emissions budgets for each state that it may require 
states to submit new or revised SIPs.
182
  After the EPA defined a state's Good Neighbor 
obligation, the state must have been provided reasonable time to implement that requirement on 
sources within the state.
183
  It was uncontroverted that the triggers for a FIP are the EPA's finding 
that a SIP fails to contain a "required submission" or the EPA's disapproving a SIP because of a 
"deficiency."
184
   The majority, however, found that a SIP cannot be deemed to lack a required 
submission or be deemed deficient for failing to implement the Good Neighbor obligation until 
after the EPA had defined the state's Good Neighbor obligation.
185
  "The regulated entities—
here, the upwind States—need more precise guidance to know how to conform their conduct to 
the law.  A SIP logically cannot be deemed to lack a 'required submission' or deemed to be 
deficient for failure to meet the [G]ood [N]eighbor obligation before EPA quantifies the [G]ood 
[N]eighbor obligation."
186
 
 In concluding that a state cannot be required to address its Good Neighbor obligation 
until the EPA determines what that obligation is, the majority relied on the canon of statutory 
construction that the words of a statute must be read in context and with a view of their place in 
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the overall statutory scheme.
187
  In the majority's view, determining the level of reductions 
required under the Good Neighbor provision is analogous to setting a NAAQS, and it is such a 
determination that triggers the period during which states may submit SIPs or SIP revisions.
188
   
That approach fits comfortably within the statutory text and 
structure. In both situations—setting a NAAQS and defining 
States' good neighbor obligations—EPA sets the numerical end 
goal. And in both cases, once the standards are set, 'determining 
the particular mix of controls among individual sources to attain 
those standards' remains 'a State responsibility.'
189
 
 
 The majority also relied on the fact that the EPA has applied the Good Neighbor 
provision in the past, exactly as the majority here construes the statute.
190
  Based on these 
principles, the majority vacated the Transport Rule and the Transport Rules FIPs and remanded 
the proceeding to the EPA.
191
  It also directed the EPA to continue administering CAIR pending 
the promulgation of a valid replacement.
192
 
ii. Homer City Dissent 
 
a. The EPA's Use of Cost-Considerations 
 
 With respect to the majority's position regarding the use of cost-based standards to 
establish each state's Good Neighbor obligation, the dissent only challenged this position on 
jurisdictional, not substantive, grounds.
193
  This Comment only addresses substantive issues, and 
therefore the dissent offers nothing significant in this regard. 
b. The EPA's Use of FIP's 
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 With respect to the EPA's FIP first approach, the dissent evaluated its validity by 
focusing on the strict statutory language.
194
  The language of the CAA unquestionably requires 
the EPA to issue a FIP within two years after a state fails to make a "required submission" or 
submits a deficient SIP.
195
  As noted above, the majority held that a state could not be required to 
incorporate its Good Neighbor obligation into a SIP until after the EPA quantified that 
obligation.
196
  To the dissent, this holding misleadingly suggested that the text of the CAA 
actually requires the EPA to establish Good Neighbor obligations in the first instance, in which 
case the promulgation of a SIP addressing the states Good Neighbor obligation could not 
logically be required until the thresholds are set by the EPA.
197
  The dissent viewed this as a 
falsity and therefore reproduced the relevant statutory language, emphasizing the critical 
language: 
(a)(1) Each State shall . . . adopt and submit to the Administrator, 
within 3 years (or such shorter period as the Administrator may 
prescribe) after the promulgation of a [NAAQS] (or any revision 
thereof) . . . a plan which provides for implementation, 
maintenance, and enforcement of such [ ] standard . . . within such 
State. 
(2) Each implementation plan submitted by a State under this 
chapter . . . shall 
. . . 
(D) contain adequate provisions— 
(i) prohibiting, consistent with the provisions of this subchapter, 
any source or other type of emissions activity within the State from 
emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will— 
(I) contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with 
maintenance by, any other State with respect to any such 
[NAAQS].
198
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 To the dissent, the plain text required that within three years of the EPA's promulgation 
of a NAAQS, states were required to submit their SIPs, and those SIPs were required to include 
adequate Good Neighbor provisions.
199
  The dissent believed that this plain reading represented 
the unambiguous chronology established by Congress—the EPA has the initial burden to set the 
NAAQS, and then the states have a series of follow-up duties to ensure attainment of the 
NAAQS; one such duty clearly assigned to the states being the inclusion of adequate Good 
Neighbor provisions in SIPs.
200
  Notably absent from the statute, in the dissent's view, is any 
requirement that the EPA quantify each state's Good Neighbor obligation.
201
  The dissent found 
the failure of the unambiguous text to impose such a requirement on the EPA to dramatically 
undermine the majority position that it was such action by the EPA that triggered "the period 
during which States may submit SIPs."
202
  Furthermore, the dissent found that, even if the statute 
were ambiguous, the court would be required to defer to the EPA's interpretation that states have 
an independent obligation to include Good Neighbor provisions in their SIPs within three years 
of the promulgation of the NAAQS because such an interpretation is permissible under the 
statute.
203
 
 The dissents conclusion is predicated upon the canons of statutory construction that the 
court must begin with the language of the statute
204
 and "[w]hen the words of a statute are 
unambiguous, then . . .  judicial inquiry is complete."
205
  Applying these principles to the actions 
of the EPA as an administrative agency, the first step in statutory interpretation requires a 
determination of "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the 
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intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."
206
  If, however, "the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," the court must defer to an agency's 
statutory interpretation if it "is based on a permissible construction of the statute."
207
 
 The dissent went on to contend that even though the EPA, in previous instances, 
implemented the SIP/FIP process with respect to Good Neighbor obligations as the majority now 
required, the EPA was not restricted to its previous policy choices.
208
  For the dissent, so long as 
the EPA acknowledged that it was taking a different approach, presented "good reasons" for 
doing so, and its new approach was "permissible under the statute," then it could in fact take a 
different approach.
209
  "Agencies 'need not demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that the reasons 
for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one.'"
210
  The dissent stressed that the 
EPA acknowledged its previous approach and explained its decision in "response to comments" 
requesting states be given time to submit SIPs before EPA imposed the FIPs.
211
 The EPA 
explained its decision on the grounds that it had "no authority to alter the statutory deadlines for 
SIP submissions and that the CAA did not require it to issue a rule quantifying States' '[G]ood 
[N]eighbor' obligations."
212
  Moreover, "the court in North Carolina, in remanding rather than 
vacating CAIR, 'emphasized EPA's obligation to remedy [CAIR's] flaws expeditiously' and thus 
'EPA d[id] not believe it would be appropriate to establish a lengthy transition period to the rule 
which is to replace CAIR.'"
213
  Because the EPA explained why it was departing from its 
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previous approach, the dissent believed that the FIP first approach was within the EPA's 
authority.
214
 
IV. INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF THE DIVERGING OPINIONS 
 
 As detailed above in Section III, the Transport Rule was struck down on two grounds. 
First, the majority found that EPA's cost-based approach to apportioning Good Neighbor 
obligations inconsistent with the statute and the D.C. Circuit precedent on the issue.
215
  Secondly, 
the majority found the FIP first approach to be counter to the statutory text.
216
  In contrast, the 
dissent believed the EPA acted within its authority.
217
  This section analyzes the legal bases on 
which the court relied to reach these conclusions.  
A.  Validity of the EPA's Cost-Based Approach 
 To determine whether the EPA’s cost-based approach to assigning Good Neighbor 
obligations was appropriate, courts must correctly interpret and apply the principles laid out in 
Michigan and North Carolina.  Engaging in such an analysis demonstrates that although the 
Homer City holding can be reconciled with the pure statutory text, the holding is inconsistent 
with precedent, and therefore EPA's interpretation of the Good Neighbor provision should have 
been deemed permissible under the Chevron analysis.  The Homer City holding significantly 
restricts the EPA's ability to use cost-based factors in apportioning Good Neighbor obligations.  
This regression by the D.C. Circuit places the EPA in an untenable position if the EPA is to 
continue to achieve air quality gains in an efficient manner.  
 As detailed in Section II above, the two main cases interpreting the Good Neighbor 
provision are Michigan and North Carolina.  These cases interpreted the "significantly contribute 
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to non-attainment" language that is the focal point of the Good Neighbor provision.  Equal 
weight, however, should not be conferred unto to the analyses of each case.  Michigan is much 
more on point because the Transport Rule is essentially an extension of the rule reviewed in 
Michigan.  Additionally, North Carolina struck down CAIR primarily on arbitrary and 
capricious grounds, not on the merits of the rule as applied to the CAA.  Therefore, the D.C. 
Circuit's substantive application of North Carolina to support its Good Neighbor analysis is 
misplaced.  
 In several respects, the rule that was reviewed in Michigan is structurally similar to the 
Transport Rule.  Both rules established a base-line threshold for determining which states were 
significant contributors.
218
  In both instances, the process by which the EPA established this 
base-line threshold was not challenged.  After determining which states were significant 
contributors, both rules then utilized a cost-based analysis to quantify the Good Neighbor 
obligations of those states.
219
  In these respects, the two rules appear to operate almost 
identically.  There is, however, one critical operative distinction that led the court to uphold the 
rule in Michigan, but to strike down the Transport Rule—proportionality.   
 In Michigan, operation of the rule in question led to a reduction in the Good Neighbor 
obligations of some significant contributors.
220
  The use of cost considerations, however, only 
served to reduce potential Good Neighbor obligations and there was no evidence that any states 
saw a corresponding gain in obligations.
221
  Although the framework of the Transport Rule was 
similar, it resulted in some significant contributors being tasked with greater Good Neighbor 
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obligations then would have applied absent use of the cost-based factors.
222
  It was this 
distinction that led the majority to conclude that the Transport Rule was invalid because the 
result was to effectively shift the burden of reducing emissions from states that could not do so 
cost effectively, to those that could—a factor not related to actual contribution to downwind non-
attainment.
223
 
 This line of analysis by the majority in Homer City places great weight on use of the term 
"significant."  When the majority uses the term "significant," it uses it as a direct parallel to the 
manner in which significant is used in the statute—the significance of emissions being defined 
solely in terms of its absolute impact on non-attainment downwind.
224
  But a different approach 
was taken by the court in Michigan. In Michigan, the court viewed significance more pliably, 
finding that the EPA may "consider differences in cutback costs, so that, after reduction of all 
that could be cost-effectively eliminated, any remaining 'contribution' would not be considered 
'significant.'"
225
  Thus, in Michigan, the D.C. Circuit took the position that the EPA's initial 
threshold for determining which states were significant contributors could be detached from the 
ultimate determination of the required reductions.
226
 The EPA tried to utilize this very same 
approach with the Transport Rule by first defining which states were significant contributors and 
then using independent criteria—cost-based factors—to determine the extent of the required 
reductions.
227
  Although, as a framework, this is entirely consistent with Michigan, the Michigan 
court was not faced with some states being tasked with increased burdens through the use of the 
independent cost-based criteria.  Therefore, in context, the Homer City court's refusal to adopt 
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"significant" as expansively as the court in Michigan is understandable, and in applying 
Michigan, it can be seen how the Transport Rule was struck down.  The Transport Rule 
undoubtedly extended the use of cost-based factors beyond the use in Michigan and the Homer 
City court decided that the extent of the EPA's latitude was defined in Michigan.  The Homer 
City court, however, did not rely on Michigan alone.
228
  And it is the D.C. Circuit's application of 
the principles from North Carolina that leaves its interpretation of the EPA's authority under the 
Good Neighbor provision inconsistent and severely constraining. 
 Homer City makes clear that not only is the EPA unable to use cost-based factors to 
increase a state's Good Neighbor obligation, but the EPA must also ensure that its program does 
not result in over-control in the downwind states.
229
  Applying this second principle, the severe 
constrictions on the EPA become apparent.  Certainly, the EPA must minimally ensure that the 
Good Neighbor obligations it establishes are sufficient to ensure attainment of the NAAQS.  But 
at the same time, its measures must not result in over-control.
230
  Abstractly, these two 
requirements create a level of emissions reductions that the EPA must achieve; not too much or 
over control results, and not too little because the downwind states won't meet their NAAQS.  
Superficially, this appears reasonable.  The EPA's ability to consider cost factors to reduce Good 
Neighbor obligations, however—a practice which remains authorized following Homer City—
has not yet been considered in conjunction with these mandates.  Cost factors have become 
engrained in the EPA's approach to compliance with the CAA.
231
  The court in Michigan 
endorsed this approach by upholding the EPA's practice of reducing the Good Neighbor 
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obligations of various states based on cost factors.
232
  Homer City, however, implicitly precludes 
this same practice. 
 If the EPA reduces a states' Good Neighbor obligations pursuant to Michigan, but cannot 
achieve a corresponding gain from another state, for how will the reduced Good Neighbor 
obligations be accounted?  Based on the majority analysis in Homer City, the reduced Good 
Neighbor obligations cannot be accounted for elsewhere.  So even assuming that the EPA could 
initially strike the appropriate balance of "not too much, not too little," this balance would be 
destroyed when the EPA reduces Good Neighbor obligations based on cost factors, as allowed 
by Michigan.  The EPA's use of cost-based factors to only reduce the Good Neighbor obligations 
of some states, without a corresponding gain elsewhere, would result in under-control and a 
failure to attain downwind NAAQS.  In short, under Homer City, the EPA's options are to only 
reduce Good Neighbor obligations based on cost-based factors as allowed by Michigan, with the 
understanding that downwind NAAQS will not be attained, or to ignore cost considerations 
altogether in apportioning Good Neighbor obligations, thereby abandoning over a decade of 
regulatory development. 
 In Michigan, the court allowed the EPA to consider cost factors.
233
  The EPA ran with 
this leeway and made cost factors the linchpin behind its approach to implementing the Good 
Neighbor provision.
234
  Moving forward, the restriction of this discretion by the D.C. Circuit in 
Homer City will make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for the EPA to achieve its 
mission in a practical way.  Somewhat ironically, the D.C. Circuit's approach in Homer City is 
entirely consistent with the plain language of the CAA.  It is only when the import of Homer City 
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is read in conjunction with Michigan, that the absurdity of the D.C. Circuit's Good Neighbor 
provision jurisprudence becomes apparent. 
B.  Validity of the EPA's FIP first approach 
 
 The issue presented with respect to the SIP/FIP dynamic of the Good Neighbor provision 
is a classic Chevron deference issue.  Under Chevron, where the statute speaks directly to the 
question at issue, the court will afford no deference to the EPA's interpretation, but rather "must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."
235
  But where the statute does 
"not directly address[ ] the precise question at issue, . . . the question for the court is whether the 
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute," and the court will only 
reverse that determination if it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."236  
An action is "arbitrary and capricious" if the agency implementing the regulation in question has 
relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an 
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the 
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in 
view or the product of agency expertise.
237
 
 With these background principles in mind, the dissent convincingly undermines the 
majority's interpretation of the statutory text with respect to the SIP/FIP dynamic.  The text of the 
statute plainly provides significant contributors three years from the establishment of the 
NAAQS to implement SIPs.
238
  Furthermore, the statute clearly requires that the SIPs include 
several components, including measures to satisfy the states Good Neighbor obligations.
239
  If 
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the state fails to do so, the obligation shifts to the EPA to promulgate adequate FIPS.
240
  There is 
nothing in the plain and unambiguous sequence laid out in the statute suggesting that the states 
may delay the promulgation of a sufficient SIP, while it awaits the establishment of a numerical 
Good Neighbor obligation by the EPA.  In fact, as the dissent points out, the CAA does not 
require the EPA to quantify Good Neighbor obligations at all.  Although the CAA does not 
require the EPA to establish numerical Good Neighbor obligations, the majority requires that the 
EPA do so before the states can be expected to promulgate SIPs incorporating Good Neighbor 
obligations.  Thus, it is not a reading of the plain text, nor can it be, that leads the majority to this 
conclusion.  The majority, however, fails to recognize that it must first identify ambiguity or 
absurdity before moving beyond the plain language of the statute.  
 The majority, rather, relies on the structure of the CAA.  Based on this perspective, 
"determining the level of reductions required under [the Good Neighbor provision] is analogous 
to setting a NAAQS."
241
  Here the majority ignores a critical point; the statute specifically calls 
for the EPA to set NAAQS, but it does not call for the EPA to determine the level of reductions 
required under the Good Neighbor provision.  So, while the majority can, in a conclusory 
manner, analogize between the setting of a NAAQS and the establishment of numerical Good 
Neighbor obligations, Congress expressly established the process for setting the NAAQS and did 
not do so for the establishment of the Good Neighbor obligations.  
 Because of the above flaws in the majority reasoning, the Transport Rule should have 
been upheld, as within the statutory authority of the EPA, and as consistent with the D.C. Circuit 
precedent interpreting the contours of the Good Neighbor provision.   
V. REGULATORY VS. STATUTORY FIX 
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  The EPA cannot reconcile the principles laid out by the Homer City majority with the 
continued use of cost considerations to establish Good Neighbor obligations.  Therefore, any 
future rule promulgated by the EPA must quantify actual downwind contributions that 
significantly contribute to non-attainment and simply require each state to eliminate that quantity 
of emissions.  The EPA could easily amend the Transport Rule in this manner to arrive at a rule 
compliant with the Homer City majority's view of the CAA.  When the EPA establishes a 
numerical threshold identifying those states that are significant contributors, this threshold must 
be such that were every significant contributor to reduce its emissions to that level, all downwind 
states would attain the NAAQS, but not result in over-control on the upwind states.  It appears as 
though this is precisely what the EPA did with step one of the Transport Rule.  However, what 
departs from the process employed by the Transport Rule is that the EPA must then require all 
significant contributors to reduce their emissions to that threshold, irrespective of the costs 
involved.  The result would strike the appropriate balance required by the Homer City majority.  
With respect to the FIP first approach that was struck down, the solution is even simpler. The 
EPA must provide the state's the first opportunity to implement the necessary reductions through 
their SIPs.  Therefore, the EPA could relatively easily amend the Transport Rule to be compliant 
with the Homer City majority's construction of the CAA. 
 The above solution, however, only demonstrates that the EPA could promulgate a rule 
within the confines imposed by the Homer City majority.  Practicality, however, dictates that 
cost considerations must be included in the analysis.  Implementing an economical approach to 
pollution control was identified as one of goals of the CAA Amendments of 1990.
242
  It was 
those amendments that established the emission trading programs that now supplement the 
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traditional command-and-control approach to pollution control.
243
  The objective of this 
economic shift in environmental policy was to ensure that expensive regulatory measures 
achieve commensurate benefits "in terms of reducing threats to health and the environment."
244
  
Only a finite number of resources can be committed to pollution control; that is not a brush aside 
of the need for environmental progress, but is a reality.  Environmental gains are more difficult 
to come by now than they were in 1970 when the CAA was first passed.  The "low hanging fruit" 
has been picked.  The past occurrences in Donora, Pennsylvania and London, England are not at 
risk of recurring.  Progress is no longer easy, so for the EPA to achieve the most significant 
gains, it must ensure that resources are used effectively.  And simply promulgating a rule that 
reverts to the tired "command-and-control" approach is not enough.  For that reason a statutory 
amendment appears necessary.  
 The statutory amendment could be relatively simple and still provide the EPA the 
flexibility that it requires to continue making environmental headway.  The amendment could 
consist of deeming all contributions to a downwind non-attainment area as "significant."  Such a 
provision would make clear that if a state is contributing to a downwind non-attainment area, the 
EPA has the authority to require that state to eliminate all of its downwind contributions.  The 
amendment would not, however, alter the limits set by the NAAQS.  So although the EPA would 
have the technical authority to require a state to eliminate all downwind contributions, this 
authority would be tempered by the judicial mandate to avoid over control.  That is, the EPA 
could only require a state to reduce downwind contributions as necessary to attain the NAAQS.  
Deeming all downwind contributions as "significant" would provide the EPA the discretion to 
reduce a state's Good Neighbor obligations based on cost-considerations without risk of violating 
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the judicially announced "proportionality" standard.  That is because deeming all contributions 
as "significant" would effectively eliminate the proportionality requirement.  Because all 
contributions would be "significant," any use of cost-based factors by the EPA would serve to 
reduce, and only reduce, that state's obligation—there would be no corresponding increased 
obligation elsewhere. 
 Such a statutory amendment would recognize air pollution as a problem of all states that 
can only be managed through cooperation. It would limit the costs of environmental gains, 
ensure that such gains are actually accomplished, and stop the continual delays that result from 
incessant litigation.    
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The D.C. Circuit has created an untenable situation for the EPA.  As the statute and 
doctrine stands, the EPA is unable to formulate a rule that will satisfy its statutory mandate in an 
efficient, practical manner.  There are two ways to alleviate this problem. The Supreme Court 
can grant a writ of certiorari and announce a CAA interpretation that does not so severely 
constrain the EPA's flexibility.  In the alternative, an amendment to the CAA is necessary.  
Absent one of these circumstances, the EPA will be left to address its statutory mandate without 
the tools to do so consistent with the intent of the 1990 CAA Amendments.   
 
